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44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island: The
Supreme Court Overturns a Ban on Liquor
Price Advertising
In 44 Liquormart,Inc. v. Rhode Island,1 two licensed liquor retailers
brought suit against the Rhode Island Liquor Control Administrator to
challenge the First Amendment validity of state statutes that banned
the price advertising of alcoholic beverages. In a unanimous decision,
the United States Supreme Court overturned the ban,2 a judgment
which may render similar restrictions unconstitutional.

I.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In 1991, 44 Liquormart, a licensed retailer of alcoholic beverages in
Rhode Island, placed an advertisement in a local newspaper. Although
the advertisement did not directly state liquor prices, it listed the prices
of items such as peanuts and potato chips and included the word "WOW"
next to pictures of rum and vodka bottles. The Rhode Island Liquor
Control Administrator concluded that the advertisement violated the
state's price-advertising ban through an implied reference to bargain
liquor prices and fined 44 Liquormart.3 44 Liquormart paid the fine
and filed an action against the Administrator in the United States
District Court for the District of Rhode Island. Peoples, a neighboring
Massachusetts retailer that also wanted to advertise in Rhode Island,
joined Liquormart in seeking a declaratory judgment that the Rhode
Island statutes
and implementing regulations violated the First
4
Amendment.

1. 116 S. Ct. 1495 (1996).
2. Id. at 1501. The principal opinion is in eight parts; only Parts I, II, VII, and VIII
received a majority. Justices Thomas, Scalia, and O'Connor filed concurring opinions.
3. Id. at 1503. Specifically, the statutory ban provided that.it was unlawful for vendors
to advertise their alcoholic beverage prices, with the exception of price tags or signs placed
on the merchandise so long as these were not visible from the street. Id. at 1501. Also,
an implementing regulation provided that any media or advertising company who

advertised the prices would be guilty of a misdemeanor. Id.
4. Id. at 1503.
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After hearing conflicting expert testimony regarding the ban's impact
on the promotion of temperance, the district court found that it had "no
significant impact on ... alcohol consumption in Rhode Island."5 The
court concluded the ban was unconstitutional because it did not directly
advance Rhode Island's interest in reducing alcohol consumption and
because it was more extensive than necessary to serve the interest.6
While acknowledging it might be reasonable to assume a connection
between the advertising ban and reduced consumption, the district court
held that a mere rational basis was not sufficient to justify the speech
restriction.7 The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
reversed, finding merit in Rhode Island's claim that allowing price
advertising created a more competitive market, resulting in lower liquor
prices and increased sales of alcoholic beverages.' The court also agreed
with the Rhode Island Supreme Court's reasoning in previous cases
upholding the ban's constitutionality on the ground that the TwentyFirst Amendment' gives the statute an additional presumption of
validity.'0
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed.1 The Court
held that Rhode Island's ban did not significantly advance the promotion
of temperance, was more extensive than necessary, and was not within
the legislature's authority to suppress truthful, nonmisleading speech.2
Furthermore, the state's power under the Twenty-First Amendment did
not render the statutes constitutional."

II.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

First Amendment protection of commercial speech is a relatively
recent development in United States history. In a 1942 case, Valentine
v. Chrestensen,4 the Court held that purely commercial speech is not
protected. In 1976, the Court recognized, for the first time, the
unconstitutionality of certain commercial speech restrictions in Virginia

5.

Id. (quoting 44 Liquor Mart, Inc. v. Racine, 829 F. Supp. 543, 549 (D.R.I. 1993)).

6. Id. (quoting 44 Liquor Mart, 829 F. Supp. at 555).
7. Id.
8. Id. (citing 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 39 F.3d 5, 7 (1st Cir. 1994)).
9. "The transportation or importation into any State, Territory, or possession of the
United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws
thereof, is hereby prohibited." U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 2.
10. 44 Liquormart, 116 S. Ct. at 1503 (citing 44 Liquormart, 39 F.3d at 8).
11. Id. at 1504-15.
12. Id. at 1506-10.
13. Id. at 1515.
14. 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942).
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State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc. 5
The Court struck down a state law prohibiting prescription drug price
advertising despite the state's asserted interest in preserving pharmacists' professional stature and the stability of pharmacist-customer
relationships. 6 The Court reasoned that the state's position was highly
paternalistic because its protection of the citizenry was based on
maintaining public ignorance.' 7 Because the restriction targeted the
content of the message in fear of its effect on its recipients, the Court
held the ban violated the First Amendment. 8
In another important case that preceded Virginia Pharmacy,the Court
in California v. LaRu' 9 considered the state's authority to prohibit
"lewd or naked dancing and entertainment" in bars and nightclubs
licensed to sell liquor.20 The Court held that while California may not
have the power to proscribe such performances under the First
Amendment, the State did have the power to do so where it issued liquor
licenses under the Twenty-First Amendment. 2' The Court upheld the
regulations and noted that the Twenty-First 22Amendment gave the law
"the added presumption in favor of validity."
In 1980, the Court returned to the issue of First Amendment
protection of commercial speech in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp.
v. Public Service Commission,2 a decision that would set the standard
for regulation of commercial speech. In CentralHudson, the Court set
out a four-step intermediate scrutiny test to evaluate the constitutionality of commercial speech restrictions.24 In that case, an electrical
utility challenged an administrative regulation that completely banned
promotional advertising by the utility in light of the state's interest in
energy conservation. 25 First, the Court held that where a communication is both related to a lawful activity and nonmisleading, governmental
control is limited."6 Second, the state interest must be substantial.27

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976).
Id. at 772.
Id. at 770.
Id. at 772.
409 U.S. 109 (1972).
Id. at 115.
Id. at 118-19.
Id. at 118.
447 U.S. 557 (1980).
Id. at 566.
Id. at 559-60.
Id. at 566.
Id.
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Third, the law must directly advance the interest. 2 Fourth, the
restriction must
be no more extensive than necessary to advance the
29
state interest.
Six years later, in Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism

Co.,30 the Court addressed the constitutionality of a statute restricting
casino gambling advertisements that targeted, the residents of Puerto
Rico, as opposed to tourists. 3' The statute also prohibited the use of
the word "casino" in promotional items such as matchbooks and napkins
if the items were accessible to the general public.3 2 To justify these
restrictions, Puerto Rico asserted several state interests, including the
prevention of moral and cultural pattern disruption and the fear of
increased crime and prostitution.3 Because the speech at issue was
purely commercial, the Court analyzed the restriction under the Central
Hudson test.34 Noting the regulation concerned a lawful, nonmisleading activity, the Court held that the law withstood the other three
prongs of CentralHudson because (1) the state's asserted interests were
substantial, (2) the restrictions directly advanced the legislature's end
of reducing demand for games of chance among Puerto Rican residents,
and (3) the regulation did so in a manner which was no more extensive
than necessary.3" The Court reasoned that Puerto Rico's power to ban
casino gambling encompassed the lesser power to ban its advertising,
calling it "strange constitutional doctrine"36 to concede the legislature's
authority to completely ban an activity yet deny 37it the authority to
reduce demand for the activity through advertising.
Most recently, in Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co. 38 the Court addressed
a challenge to a federal law that prohibited beer bottlers from displaying
alcohol contents on its labels.39 , The government argued that the ban
was needed to minimize the possibility of strength wars among brewers,
fearing they would base their marketplace competition on beer potency
and also to promote state efforts to regulate alcoholic beverages under

28. Id.

29. Id.
30.

478 U.S. 328 (1986).

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id. at 330.
Id. at 333.
Id. at 341.
Id. at 340.
Id. at 340-43.
Id. at 346.
Id. at 345-46.
115 S. Ct. 1585 (1995).
Id. at 1588.
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the Twenty-First Amendment.4' The Court again applied the Central
Hudson test.4' Because the labels contained undisputedly truthful,
nonmisleading factual information, the Court turned to the other three
prongs of the test.42 It accepted the government's interest in protecting
citizens by preventing competition based on alcohol strength, which
However, the Court
could increase alcoholism, as substantial.4
reasoned that the law did not directly advance the interest because of
the "overall irrationality" of the regulatory scheme." Brewers were
still able to divulge alcohol content through a more influential means
4
Thus, if the government's goal
advertising in much of the country"
was to stifle strength wars, the prohibition on labels made "no rational
sense" and could not withstand CentralHudson.46
III.

RATIONALE OF THE COURT

In its decision in 44 Liquormart,Inc. v. Rhode Island, the Court once
again affirmed First Amendment protection of truthful, nonmisleading
commercial speech. 47 Although the Court agreed with the commonsense conclusion that a price-advertising prohibition would temper
competition and maintain prices at a higher level than in a free market,
the Court ultimately found that the statute could not withstand the
third and fourth prongs of Central Hudson.4" Specifically, the Court
concluded that even the State's own showing revealed that any
connection between the restriction and a reduction in alcohol consumption "would be purely fortuitous."4 9 The Court found Rhode Island had
not carried its burden of proving that the prohibition directly advanced
the state interest.50 Calling the Posadas majority's deference to
legislative judgment a"sharp break""' from precedent, Justice Stevens,
writing for the plurality, explained that speculation and conjecture are
not acceptable as proof of the direct relationship. Thus, the restric-

40. Id. at 1590-91.
41.

Id. at 1589.

42. Id. at 1590.
43. Id. at 1591.
44. Id. at 1592.

45. Id.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Id.
116 S. Ct. 1495, 1507 (1996).
Id. at 1509-10.
Id. at 1510.
Id.
Id at 1511.
Id. (citing Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 770 (1993)).
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tion failed the third prong of Central Hudson.5" Further, the State
failed the fourth prong regarding whether the restriction was no more
extensive than necessary.5' The Court pointed out obvious alternatives
to a speech ban, such as direct regulation and increased taxation, which
would serve the same purpose as the ban.55
The Court rejected Rhode Island's contention that the power to ban
alcoholic beverages subsumes the lesser power to regulate related
advertising." Reasoning that prohibiting speech may sometimes be
more intrusive than prohibiting conduct, the Court said Rhode Island's
choice to license liquor retailers did not allow the state to "'deny a
benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally
protected interests-especially his interest in freedom of speech."'57
Finally, the Supreme Court disavowed its reasoning in California v.
LaRue58 by rejecting Rhode Island's LaRue-based argument that the
Twenty-First Amendment gave its ban "an added presumption in favor
of validity."59 The Court, without questioning the holding in LaRue,
to disregard
explained that the amendment does not authorize the states
6
their obligations under other parts of the Constitution. 0
In his concurrence, Justice Thomas objected to the application of the
Central Hudson balancing test.6 1 Instead, he argued that the State's
asserted interest in keeping consumers "in the dark""2 in order to affect
choices made in the marketplace was "per se illegitimate."63 He
stressed the Court's rationale in Virginia Pharmacy that even "speech
that does 'no more than propose a commercial transaction'" came within
First Amendment protection.6 4 In addition, Justice Thomas faulted the
plurality's reasoning in declaring the ban unconstitutional based in part
on Rhode Island's failure to show that the ban significantly decreased
consumption.6 ' He noted that the plurality "seem[ed] to imply that if
the State had been more successful at keeping consumers ignorant" and

53. Id. at 1510.
54.

Id.

55. Id.
56. Id. at 1512.
57. Id. at 1513 (quoting Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972)).
58. 409 U.S. 109 (1972).
59. 116 S. Ct. at 1514 (citing LaRue, 409 U.S. at 118-19).
60. Id. (citing Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 712 (1984)).
61. Id. at 1515-16 (Thomas, J., concurring).
62. Id. at 1518.
63. Id. at 1516.
64. Id.(quoting Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976)).
65. Id. at 1518.
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thus decreased consumption, then the law might have been upheld."
Specifically, Justice Thomas characterized the potential implications of
the plurality's holding as "quite sweeping" 7 because, under the fourth
prong of Central Hudson, it appeared that direct regulation such as
taxation
would always be "at least as effective" as restricting advertis8
6

ing.

In her concurrence, Justice O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, Justice Souter, and Justice Breyer, argued to apply the
CentralHudson test to determine whether the restriction survived First
Amendment scrutiny.69 Finally, Justice Scalia, like Justice Thomas,
was also uncomfortable with the plurality's application of Central
Hudson and noted the lack of a discussion of legislative policies at the
time the First Amendment was adopted. 0 However, because Justice
Scalia did not believe the Court had before them "the wherewithal to
declare CentralHudson wrong--or at least the wherewithal to say what
ought to replace it--" he resolved the case consistent with the existing
law.']

IV

IMPLICATIONS

This decision has already had a major effect on alcohol price advertising. The Supreme Court remanded two subsequent cases, AnheuserBusch, Inc. v. Schmoke72 and Hospitality Investments v. Pennsylvania
State Police,73 for consideration in light of the new decision. Furthermore, 44 Liquormartcalls into question laws similar to the Rhode Island
statutes.74
Additionally, as the Court's most recent pronouncement on commercial
speech, the decision in 44 Liquormart will be important in determining
the constitutionality of future restrictions, particularly the Food and
Drug Administration's recent regulations on tobacco advertising aimed

66. Id.
67. Id. at 1519.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1521 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
70. Id. at 1515 (Scalia, J., concurring).
71. Id.
72. 116 S. Ct. 1821 (1996) (mem.), vacating and remanding 63 F.3d 1305 (4th Cir.
1995).
73. 116 S. Ct. 1821 (1996) (mem.), vacating and remanding 650 A.2d 854 (Pa. 1994).
74. Other states, including Georgia, South Carolina, North Carolina, Arkansas,
Connecticut, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, New Hampshire, Ohio, and Pennsylvania have
laws in some way restricting liquor price advertising. Richard Carelli, Justices Debating
Liquor Ads, THE LAS VEGAS REV. J., May 2, 1995, at 7D.
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at children and adolescents.7" These include the ban of billboard
tobacco advertising within a thousand 'feet of schools and playgrounds,76 the sponsorship of sporting events attended by young people
such as NASCAR auto races, and giveaways of promotional items such
as T-shirts. 7 In addition, advertisements in magazines frequently read
by minors would be limited to black and white text.7 8
The Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") argues, under the first
prong of Central Hudson, that tobacco advertisements relate to an
unlawful activity to the extent that they target minors. 79 Arguably,
because the sale of tobacco to persons under age eighteen is illegal in all
fifty states, advertising appealing to minors would relate to an unlawful
activity, thus making this speech fall outside First Amendment
protection.8 0 On the other hand, critics point out that whether an
advertisement targets a younger audience is difficult to determine
because the use of cartoons, such as Joe Camel, can also target
adults."' Thus, they argue, because of this proof problem, tobacco
advertising would most likely be given First Amendment protection. 2
Assuming the First Amendment encompasses the restrictions under
the first prong, the next Central Hudson inquiry-whether the governThe FDA
ment interest is substantial-is generally not disputed."
health,
in
public
interest
substantial
has
a
government
argued that the
the
indicating
cited
studies
and
and especially the well-being of children,
and
morbidity
age one starts smoking will influence tobacco-related
mortality to support this proposition."
Next, under the third prong of Central Hudson, which requires that
the restrictions directly advance the asserted interest, the FDA reviewed
numerous studies on the effect of tobacco advertising on minors,
concluding that the evidence "demonstrates that [the] FDA's judgment
...is supported not only by common sense but by studies, anecdotes,

75. Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless
Tobacco to Protect Children and Adolescents, 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396 (1996) (to be codified at
21 C.F.R. §§ 801, 803, 804, 807, 820, 897).
76. Id.

77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 44,471.
80. Id.
81. Mark R. Ludwikowski, Comment, Proposed Government Regulation of Tobacco
Advertising Uses Teens to Disguise FirstAmendment Violations, 4 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS

105, 111 (1996).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 112.
84. 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,472.
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and empirical data." 5 However, critics

say establishing a connection between advertising and consumption by
minors is difficult, particularly when the law prohibits minors from
purchasing tobacco products. 8 In addition, they cite research indicating the presence of smokers in the home and peer influence has a
greater influence on teen smoking. 7
Finally, under the fourth prong, the FDA contended the regulations
were "carefully crafted" to target only "advertising that children are
routinely exposed to and that the available evidence shows has the
greatest affect on youngsters, while leaving the informational aspects of
advertising largely untouched." It emphasized that, for example, the
regulations do not ban print advertising, but only restrict the use of
images and color that are especially appealing to children in publications
with a largely young readership. 9 Thus, the FDA concluded that the
regulations go no further than necessary to meet their purpose.'
Regarding the black and white restriction, also called a "tombstone"
limitation, some commentators believe this restriction, although less
problematic than a total ban, still poses the problem of interfering with
the speaker's choice of method for expression.91 They argue that, in
some ways, tombstone limitations may be "even more pernicious" 92 than
a complete ban because "they give the illusion of allowing communication while in reality significantly interfering with the message. "93
Critics also point out that cartoon character Joe Camel "defies ...
description," and cannot necessarily be classified as targeting children.9 4 However, they acknowledge that if characters which obviously
appeal to children, such as Mickey Mouse, were restricted, the argument
against the regulation would be less persuasive. 95
Given the decision in 44 Liquormart, some commentators believe
tobacco advertising cannot be regulated because it also relates to a vice

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id. at 44,474.
Ludwikowski, supra note 81, at 113-14.
Id. at 114.
61 Fed. Reg. at 44,497.
Id.

90. Id.
91. Martin H. Redish, Tobacco Advertising and the FirstAmendment, 81 IOWA L. REV.
589, 625-26 (1996).
92. Id. at 627.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 629.
95. Id.
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activity." However, the blanket ban on all liquor price advertising is
distinguishable from the tobacco advertising regulations, which only
apply under limited circumstances, thus making the question more
complicated and the outcome more difficult to predict.
LAURA HARRISON

96. Kathleen Sullivan, Tobacco Ad Rules Would Limit Free Speech, ST. LOUIS PosTDISPATCH, June 9, 1996, at 3B.

